Dimitra Hearron, et al. v. Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation

Case Number

24CV00660

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 07/29/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer To Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Dimitra Hearron, et al. v. Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation

Case No. 24CV00660          

Hearing Date: July 29, 2024                                     

HEARING:              Demurrer To Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint                                                        

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs Dimitra Hearron, Sierra Hearron, and Zayden Ramirez: Gerald S. Ohn, Law Offices of Gerald S. Ohn, APC

                             For Defendant Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation: Marc A. Trachtman, Donald S. Zalewski, Marc Trachtman Law, PC

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of defendant Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is overruled. Defendant shall file and serve its answer to the first amended complaint of plaintiffs on or before August 9, 2024.

Background: 

On February 5, 2024, plaintiffs Dimitra Hearron (Dimitra), Sierra Hearron (Sierra), and Zayden Ramirez, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Sierra Hearron (collectively, plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation (SBCHC), alleging four causes of action: (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) negligence; (3) nuisance; and (4) violations of Civil Code section 1942.4. (Note: Due to common surnames, the Court will refer to plaintiffs by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.)

On April 4, 2024, SBCHC filed a demurrer to the complaint of plaintiffs which was withdrawn on April 29, 2024, based on the filing by plaintiffs of a first amended complaint (the FAC) on April 23, 2024. (See SBCHC Apr. 29, 2024, Notice Of Withdrawal Of Hearing On Demurrer.) The FAC, which alleges the same four causes of action against SBCHC described above, is the operative pleading. As alleged in the FAC:

SBCHC owns, operates, manages, maintains, and supervises residential property located at 47 Broadmoor, Apt. #7, in Santa Barbara, California (the Property), which is held out to the general public for rent. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 8-9 & 12.) On June 11, 2004, Dimitra entered into an agreement with SBCHC (the Agreement) to lease the Property. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Since June 2004, plaintiffs have been tenants at the Property. (Id. at ¶¶ 5 & 18.)

There existed at the Property defective conditions which affected its habitability and which were not caused by wrongful or abnormal use of the Property by plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 21.) These conditions included: leaks causing water intrusion into and damage to the Property; lack of proper ventilation; mold infiltration; cockroach, spider, and other insect infestations and a lack of insect control; inoperable stoves, ovens, heating, and smoke alarms; broken cabinets and flooring; deteriorated window frames and walls; and an unpermitted water heater. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 21, & 41.)

On March 24, 2023, SBCHC was notified by the City of Santa Barbara Building and Safety Department of violations of health and safety codes or housing laws. (FAC, ¶¶ 15, 44 & Exh. A [“Notice Of Violation Warning Letter” dated Mar. 24, 2023].) SBCHC failed to make repairs or abate the conditions for a period of more than 35 days after service of citations upon it and thereafter, demanded, attempted to collect, and collected rent from plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 34, 45-46.) In addition, the failure of SBCHC to make repairs to the Property created conditions which interfered with plaintiffs’ use of the Property, caused plaintiffs to suffer property damage, and caused plaintiffs to suffer physical and emotional injuries and to incur medical and related expenses. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 31-32, 34, 37.)

On May 28, 2024, SBCHC filed a special and general demurrer to the first, third, and fourth causes of action alleged in the FAC. The demurrer is opposed by plaintiffs.

Analysis:

In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The pleading subject to demurrer is given a reasonable interpretation and read as a whole, with all its parts in their context. (Ibid.) A demurrer assumes the truth of properly pleaded material allegations including facts which may be inferred from those expressly alleged, but not of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.; McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

Special demurrer to the first, third, and fourth causes of action:

As grounds for its special demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the second causes of action for negligence, and the fourth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, SBCHC contends that plaintiffs have failed to allege dates on which they discovered any defective conditions, dates on which SBCHC was notified of specific uninhabitable conditions or a need for repair, specific acts by SBCHC which constitute a breach of an alleged duty of care, SBCHC’s response to any repair requests made by plaintiffs, a specific date constituting a “reasonable time” for SBCHC to make a repair, specific dates on which SBCHC made repairs, or specific items that SBCHC refused to repair. (Memorandum at p. 3, ll. 12-16; p. 5, ll. 19-28; p. 6, ll. 1-8.) For these reasons, SBCHC argues, the claims alleged in the first, third, and fourth causes of action are uncertain and prevent SBCHC from determining whether plaintiffs have stated a cause of action.

A party may object by special demurrer on the grounds that the subject pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) “ ‘[U]ncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205, 209.) “A special demurrer on the ground that [a pleading] is (a) ambiguous, (b) unintelligible, or (c) uncertain is insufficient unless the demurrer points out specifically wherein the pleading is ambiguous, uncertain or unintelligible.” (Coons v. Thompson (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 687, 690.)

In the demurrer, SBCHC provides a general description of the allegations of the FAC. The recitation of these allegations with respect to conditions that existed at the Property which plaintiffs allege constitute a breach of the implied warranty of habitability and a nuisance, and the existence of conditions which bar SBCHC from demanding or collecting rent under Civil Code section 1942.4, demonstrates that the FAC is not unintelligible or ambiguous such that SBCHC cannot understand the issues and the nature of the claims alleged by plaintiffs. (See Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245 [“a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action”]; Dumm v. Pacific Valves (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 792, 799.) For this reason, the FAC is not so incomprehensible that SBCHC cannot reasonably respond. (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.)

Furthermore, dates on which SBCHC was notified of the conditions alleged in the FAC, any response by SBCHC to any repair request made by plaintiffs including whether SBCHC refused to repair any condition, dates on which SBCHC made any repairs, and whether SBCHC made or refused to make any requested repairs are facts which are presumptively known to SBCHC. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822 [demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when uncertain facts are within defendant’s knowledge].) To the extent the FAC is in some respects uncertain with respect to these issues, any “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

For all reasons discussed above, plaintiffs have alleged facts in a manner sufficient to apprise SBCHC of the nature and extent of the theories of liability asserted in the first, third, and fourth causes of action. To the extent some facts are uncertain but within SBCHC’s knowledge, SBCHC presents insufficient grounds on which the Court may sustain the special demurrer. Therefore, the Court will overrule the special demurrer of SBCHC to first, third, and fourth causes of action alleged in the FAC.

General demurrer to the first, third, and fourth causes of action based on Zayden’s lack of standing:

As grounds for its general demurrer to the first, third, and fourth causes of action, SBCHC contends that Zayden, who is alleged to be a minor, does not possess legal capacity to make a contract and is not a party to the Agreement. Therefore, SBCHC argues, Zayden does not have standing to prosecute the first, third, and fourth causes of action alleged in the FAC because these claims are based on the Agreement.

“’There is a difference between the capacity to sue, which is the right to come into court, and the standing to sue, which is the right to relief in court.’ [Citation.] ‘Incapacity is merely a legal disability, such as infancy or insanity, which deprives a party of the right to come into court. The right to relief, on the other hand, goes to the existence of a cause of action….’ [Citation.]” (Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1604, original italics.)  “It is well settled that only parties with a real interest in a dispute have standing to seek its adjudication. [Citation.] A real party in interest ordinarily is defined as the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law. [Citation.] ‘The question of standing to sue is one of the right to relief and goes to the existence of a cause of action against the defendant [citation].’ [Citation.] ‘The right to relief ... goes to the existence of a cause of action ... Where the complaint states a cause of action in someone, but not in the plaintiff, a general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action will be sustained.’ [Citation.].” (Killian v. Millard (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1601, 1605.)

Giving the allegations of the FAC further detailed above a reasonable interpretation, plaintiffs have expressly alleged that Zayden is a tenant at the Property. (FAC, ¶¶ 5 & 18.) It can be reasonably inferred from this express allegation that Zayden resides at the Property. Plaintiffs further allege that as a result of the conditions that existed at the Property which SBCHC purportedly failed to abate or repair, Zayden suffered physical and mental injuries and incurred medical expenses. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 31-32, 34, 37.) For present purposes, the Court accepts the truth of these allegations. (J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803.)

“[A] tenant may state a cause of action in tort against his landlord for damages resulting from a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 918-919 (Stoiber).) Moreover, “ ‘every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his rights.’ [Citation.]” (Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255.) Accordingly, a “tenancy is a sufficient property interest to give [] standing to bring an action based on nuisance….” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 919 & 920.)

Notwithstanding whether Zayden possessed the legal capacity to enter into a contract with SBCHC or is a party to the Agreement, the allegations of the FAC described above are sufficient to demonstrate that Zayden is a tenant at the Property who possesses a right to seek relief in tort for damages resulting from any purported breach of the implied warranty of habitability and from a nuisance allegedly created or unabated by SBCHC. SBCHC offers no reasoned argument to show that plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Zayden is a tenant at the Property or suffered injury or damage. Therefore, the Court will overrule the demurrer to the first and third causes of action alleged in the FAC on the ground of Zayden’s lack of standing.

The fourth cause of action is brought under Civil Code section 1942.4, which prohibits a landlord from demanding or collecting rent from a tenant if any of the conditions described in subdivision (a)(1) through (4) of that section exist. (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a).) In the FAC, plaintiffs allege that SBCHC demanded rent from each of them. (FAC, ¶ 46.) Assuming the truth of the allegations regarding the conditions which existed at the Property and that Zayden was a tenant at the Property, and notwithstanding whether Zayden had legal capacity to contract or was a party to the Agreement, SBCHC fails to explain why Zayden lacks standing to assert a cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 based on a purported demand for or collection of rent by SBCHC from Zayden at a time when the conditions alleged in the FAC and further described above existed. Moreover, for present purposes, the Court does not consider whether or not plaintiffs can prove these allegations. (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034.) For these reasons, the Court will also overrule the demurrer to the fourth cause of action on the ground of Zayden’s lack of standing to pursue this claim.

General demurrer to third and fourth causes of action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action:

As additional grounds for demurrer to the third cause of action, SBCHC asserts that, because the causes of action for nuisance and negligence are based on the same facts, the third cause of action for nuisance is a mere duplicate of the negligence cause of action such that each constitutes one cause of action. For this reason, SBCHC argues, the demurrer to the third cause of action should be sustained.

In the second cause of action, plaintiffs allege a theory of recovery for negligence based on the purported failure by SBCHC to repair conditions which existed at the Property, among other things. SBCHC does not contend that the second cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for negligence. “[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory....” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, original italics.) For this reason, “[t]he fallacy of [SBCHC’s] argument is that ‘redundancy’ is not a cause for demurrer.” (McDonell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296, 303; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10 [setting forth grounds for a demurrer to a complaint].) As redundancy is not a ground for demurrer, the Court will overrule the demurrer to the third cause of action for nuisance on this ground.

As further grounds for demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1946.4, SBCHC asserts that plaintiffs have failed to allege with requisite particularity facts showing which of the defendants were notified by a public code enforcement agency of a duty to correct any defective conditions or when, which specific public codes were listed in any such notice, facts as to the violations of health and safety codes, or whether the conditions were abated within 35 days. For these reasons, SBCHC argues, the FAC fails to allege facts showing the existence of conditions described in subdivision (a)(2) and (3) of Civil Code section 1946.4 sufficient to state a cause of action for violation of that statute.

“Where a party relies for recovery upon a purely statutory liability it is indispensable that he plead facts demonstrating his right to recover under the statute. The complaint must plead every fact which is essential to the cause of action under the statute.” (Green v. Grimes-Stassforth Stationery Co. (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 52, 56.) As further discussed above, Civil Code section 1946.4 describes the conditions that must exist before a landlord is barred from demanding or collecting rent from a tenant. Relevant here, these conditions include that “[a] public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord's agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.” (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a)(2).) In addition, the conditions must “have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause.” (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a)(3).)

On demurrer, the court may consider evidentiary facts found in exhibits attached to the pleading at issue. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) As noted above, the FAC incorporates by reference and attaches as exhibit A, a document titled “Notice Of Violation Warning Letter” from the City of Santa Barbara Community Development Department, Building and Safety (the Notice). (FAC, ¶ 15.) The Notice is dated March 24, 2023, and is directed to SBCHC. (Id. at PDF p. 13.) The subject of the Notice is the Property, and its stated purposes is to inform SBCHC “of the violation(s) on the [] [P]roperty, to give [SBCHC] a reasonable timeframe to abate the violation(s), and to inform [SBCHC] of the consequences of not abating the violation(s) or repeating the violation(s).” (Ibid.) The Notice describes violations of the Santa Barbara Municipal Code and other codes or statutes, corrective actions required to remedy or abate the violations, and dates by which the violations must be remedied or abated. (Id. at PDF pp. 13-14.) In the FAC, plaintiffs effectively allege that SBCHC did not make the required repairs for a period of more than 35 days after service of the Notice. (Id. at ¶ 45.)

Giving the FAC a reasonable interpretation and accepting its allegations as true including those appearing in exhibit A, plaintiffs have alleged facts demonstrating the existence of the conditions described in subdivision (a)(2) and (3) of Civil Code section 1942.4 with respect to whether SBCHC was notified by a public employee of its obligation to abate a nuisance or repair substandard conditions and whether the conditions existed or were not abated 35 days beyond the date of the notice by a public employee. Apart from the contentions further addressed above, SBCHC does not contend that plaintiffs have failed to allege the existence of other conditions described in subdivision (a)(1) and (4) as grounds for its general demurrer to the fourth cause of action alleged in the FAC. Therefore, and for all reasons discussed above, the Court will overrule the demurrer to the fourth cause of action on the grounds asserted by SBCHC.

The request for judicial notice of SBCHC:

In support of its reply papers, SBCHC submits a request for judicial notice of Sierra and Zayden’s responses to interrogatories served by SBCHC. (SBCHC RFJN, ¶¶ 1-2 & Exhs. A & B.) Notwithstanding that a party’s discovery responses are not proper subjects of judicial notice, these responses constitute matters extrinsic to the FAC which the Court cannot consider on demurrer. (See Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider matters raised in memorandum and not otherwise pleaded]; Executive Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente Country Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 496, 499-500 [also noting that the court is precluded from weighing disputed facts on demurrer].) For these reasons, the Court will deny SBCHC’s request for judicial notice of Sierra and Zayden’s responses to interrogatories.