Walter John Rason v. Department of Motor Vehicles

Case Number

24CV01138

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 07/29/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer To Plaintiff’s Complaint

Tentative Ruling

Walter John Rason v. Department of Motor Vehicles

Case No. 24CV01138           

Hearing Date: July 29, 2024                                      

HEARING:              Demurrer To Plaintiff’s Complaint

                                                           

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Walter John Rason: Self Represented

                             For Defendant Department of Motor Vehicles: Rob Bonta, Gary S. Balekjian, Nancy M. Droege, Office of the Attorney General

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of defendant the Department of Motor Vehicles to plaintiff’s complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff Walter John Rason shall file and serve his first amended complaint on or before August 9, 2024. Defendant shall serve notice of the Court’s ruling herein.

Background: 

On February 29, 2024, self-represented plaintiff Walter John Rason (Rason) filed a complaint in this action against defendant the Department of Motor Vehicles (the Department). The complaint appears to allege two causes of action, one for “damages” and the other for “declaratory relief”. (Compl. at p. 1.) The allegations of the complaint are set forth in 3 brief paragraphs in which Rason alleges that he resides in Santa Barbara County, and that the Department failed to provide Rason with a copy of his failed driver’s safety test pursuant to the “Information Practice Act of 1977” and the “Federal Privacy Act, Public Law 93-578.” (Id. at ¶¶ 1-2.)

Rason attaches as exhibit F to the complaint what he alleges is “documentation pursuant to Federal and State law, before suit, of [Rason’s] efforts to retrieve [his] personal information to delete, opt out, right to non- discrimination, to correct, to limit. the use, and the right to show this information to this Court for declaratory relief and damages according to proof.” (Compl., ¶ 2.) Also attached to the complaint as exhibit G is the Department’s “final decision on this matter.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) Rason seeks monetary damages against the Department in an amount not less than $2,000,000. (Prayer, ¶ 1.)

Court records reflect that on March 29, 2024, the Department filed a declaration in support of an automatic 30 day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading. The declaration is signed by counsel for the Department, Nancy Droege (Droege). In the Droege declaration filed on March 29, 2024, Droege states that she sent a letter to Rason on March 27, 2024, detailing the Department’s substantive grounds for a demurrer to the complaint. (Droege Decl., ¶ 2.) The letter was sent by “Fed-Ex overnight” more than 5 days before a responsive pleading was due on April 4, 2024. (Ibid.) Droege also spoke with Rason by telephone on March 26, 2024, requesting a call when Rason received the letter. (Ibid.) As of March 29, 2024, Droege had not received a response to the letter from Rason. (Ibid.) For these reasons, Droege asserts that she was unable to meet and confer with Rason at least five days prior to the date a responsive pleading was due. (Ibid.)

On May 2, 2024, the Department filed a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

On May 10, 2024, Rason filed a declaration purporting to be in opposition to the service of a subpoena and the demurrer to the complaint, stating that he was not served with proper notice of the hearing on the demurrer and requesting that the Court deny the demurrer on this basis.

Court records reflect that on May 29, 2024, Rason filed a stipulation in which the parties agreed that the hearing would be continued to July 29, 2024. On the same date, the Court signed its order upon consideration of the parties’ stipulation continuing the hearing on the demurrer to July 29, 2024, as requested by the parties.

On July 15, 2024, Rason filed a declaration in opposition to the demurrer.

Analysis:

In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The pleading subject to demurrer is given a reasonable interpretation and read as a whole, with all its parts in their context. (Ibid.) A demurrer assumes the truth of properly pleaded material allegations including facts which may be inferred from those expressly alleged, but not of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.; McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

Timeliness of the demurrer:

In his declaration filed on July 15, 2024, Rason contends that the demurrer was not timely filed by the Department and therefore should be overruled. Rason also appears to request that the Court enter a default judgment against the Department based on the purportedly untimely filing of the demurrer. (See Jul. 15, 2024, Rason Decl. at p. 1; p. 2, ¶ 1(b) & (c); p. 3, l. 21 – p. 4, l. 8; p. 7, ¶ 13.)

“A person against whom a complaint … has been filed may, within 30 days after service of the complaint …, demur to the complaint ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (a).) (Note: Undesignated code references herein shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.) The Court’s records reflect that Rason filed a proof of service of summons in this action on March 11, 2024, stating that the summons and complaint together with other supporting documents were personally served on the Department on March 5, 2024. (Mar. 11, 2024, POS.) Accordingly, under section 430.40, subdivision (a), the deadline for the Department to file a demurrer to the complaint fell on April 4, 2024.

Section 430.41, subdivision (a), requires that, prior to filing a demurrer, the demurrer party must “meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) “If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least 5 days before the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)

As further described above, the Droege declaration filed on March 29, 2024, is made under penalty of perjury, describes Droege’s good faith attempt to meet and confer with Rason, and explains why the parties could not meet and confer. There is no information or evidence to suggest that the statements made by Droege in her declaration are not truthful. In addition, attached to the Droege declaration is a proof of service demonstrating that the declaration was served on Rason on March 29, 2024, by overnight courier (FedEx) at the address identified by Rason in his complaint. Therefore, for all reasons discussed above, the Department has demonstrated its entitlement to an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file the demurrer.

Section 430.41 further provides that “[t]he 30-day extension shall commence from the date the responsive pleading was previously due, and the demurring party shall not be subject to default during the period of the extension.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) As further discussed above, the Department was previously required to file its demurrer on or before April 4, 2024. Following the filing of the Droege declaration which establishes the Department’s entitlement to an automatic 30-day extension of time for reasons further discussed above, the demurrer was filed on May 2, 2024, which falls within the 30-day extension provided under section 430.41, subdivision (a)(2). For these reasons, the demurrer was timely filed by the Department. In addition, the Department was not subject to default during the extension period. Therefore, the Court finds that the Department is not subject to default and declines to overrule the demurrer on the grounds that the demurrer was not timely filed.

Special demurrer for uncertainty:

The Department contends that the complaint is uncertain because it does not clearly identify its causes of action. A party may object by special demurrer on the grounds that the subject pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) “ ‘[U]ncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205, 209.) “A special demurrer on the ground that [a pleading] is (a) ambiguous, (b) unintelligible, or (c) uncertain is insufficient unless the demurrer points out specifically wherein the pleading is ambiguous, uncertain or unintelligible.” (Coons v. Thompson (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 687, 690.)

As further discussed above, Rason purports to bring his causes of action for damages and declaratory relief under the “Information Practice Act of 1977” which the Court understands to refer to Civil Code section 1798 et seq., known as the “Information Practices Act of 1977” (the Information Act). (Civ. Code, § 1798.)

“ ‘The Information Practices Act, enacted in 1977, generally imposes limitations on the right of governmental agencies to disclose personal information about an individual. [Citations.] “The statute was designed by the Legislature to prevent misuse of the increasing amount of information about citizens which government agencies amass in the course of their multifarious activities, the disclosure of which could be embarrassing or otherwise prejudicial to individuals or organizations.” [Citations.] Section 1798.63 provides that the provisions of the Information Practices Act “shall be liberally construed so as to protect the rights of privacy arising under this chapter or under the Federal or State Constitution.” ’ ” (Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 373.)

Section 1798.24 of the Information Act sets forth the conditions under which an agency shall permit an individual to inspect personal information in the records maintained by the agency. Among other things and subject to exceptions, the agency shall permit an inspection “within 30 days of the agency’s receipt of the request for active records, and within 60 days of the agency’s receipt of the request for records that are geographically dispersed or which are inactive and in central storage.” (Civ. Code, § 1798.34, subd. (a).) Also subject to conditions and exceptions, an agency shall also permit an individual to obtain specified copies “within 15 days of the inspection.” (Civ. Code, § 1798.34, subd. (b).)

The Information Act authorizes individuals to bring a civil action against an agency if the agency “[r]efuses to comply with an individual’s lawful request to inspect pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1798.34’, “[f]ails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may be made on the basis of such record, if, as a proximate result of such failure, a determination is made which is adverse to the individual”, or “[f]ails to comply with any other provision of this chapter, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual.” (Civ. Code, § 1798.45, subd. (a)-(c).)

Furthermore, in a suit brought under the provisions of Civil Code section 1798.45, a court may enjoin and agency from withholding records and may assess against the agency fees and costs reasonably incurred in the suit by a prevailing complainant. (Civ. Code, § 1798.46, subd. (a) & (b).)

“Where a party relies for recovery upon a purely statutory liability it is indispensable that he plead facts demonstrating his right to recover under the statute. The complaint must plead every fact which is essential to the cause of action under the statute.” (Green v. Grimes-Stassforth Stationery Co. (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 52, 56.) The sparse allegations of the complaint filed by Rason in this action do not sufficiently identify any facts essential to demonstrating a right to relief under the Information Act and do not connect any allegations to any specific cause of action, or the elements of a cause of action, under the Information Act. For example, Rason does not allege facts demonstrating a request made under Civil Code section 1798.34, a refusal by the Department to comply with a lawful request, or a failure by the Department to maintain records in the manner required under the Information Act. In addition, it is unclear on what basis Rason seeks to recover damages in the sum of $2,000,000 under the Information Act. For these reasons, the theory of recovery alleged by Rason under the Information Act is uncertain.

Rason also purports to bring his claims for damages and declaratory relief under the “Federal Privacy Act, Public Law 93-578” which the Court understands to refer to the Privacy Act of 1974 codified at 5 U.S.C. 552a (the Privacy Act). The Privacy Act “governs the responsibilities of federal agencies in the disclosure of, access to, and content of their records concerning individuals.” (Miller v. U.S. (E.D.N.Y. 1986) 630 F.Supp. 347, 348.) Rason alleges no facts demonstrating that the Department is a federal agency. Therefore, the theory of recovery alleged under the Privacy Act is also unclear.

In addition, because Rason has failed to identify any allegations to the elements of a cause of action under the Information Act or Privacy Act, the subject of the ostensible cause of action for declaratory relief, including the nature of the controversy involving the rights and duties of the parties to this action, is also unclear. (See Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546 [setting forth elements of an action for declaratory relief].) Furthermore, “[d]eclaratory relief generally is not available to use the courts to tell an administrative agency how to do its job.” (Monterey Coastkeeper v. Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 18.)

To the complaint, Rason attaches over 40 pages of exhibits in a haphazard fashion without connecting the exhibits to any particular allegation, cause of action, or claim for relief. Furthermore, many of these exhibits are handwritten and illegible. To the extent Rason contends that facts supporting a cause of action for damages or declaratory relief under the Information Act or Privacy Act appear in these exhibits, they must be alleged in the complaint. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245 [a plaintiff is required to “set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action”].)

In the declaration filed by Rason on July 15, 2024, Rason indicates that he demands a copy of his driver’s safety test together with costs of suit, punitive, and personal damages based on the withholding of his personal information “on the basis of these laws mentioned in his complaint….” (Jul. 15, 2024, Rason Decl. at p. 8, ll. 3-7.) Rason’s July 15, 2024, declaration also fails to connect any allegations to the elements of a cause of action under either the Information Act or Privacy Act. In addition, Rason does not appear to allege in the complaint a cause of action relating to a demand for a copy of his driver’s safety test nor does Rason identify any allegations to a cause of action relating to any demand for a copy of his driver’s safety test. For this additional reason, the complaint is uncertain.

The examples cited above are intended to illustrative but not exhaustive, and the Court declines to issue an advisory opinion as to the manner in which Rason may amend the complaint to cure the uncertainties further described above. (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 119 [“[t]he rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this court”].) For all reasons further discussed above, the Department cannot reasonably understand the nature, source, and extent of the causes of action for damages or declaratory relief under the Information Act or the Privacy Act identified in the complaint. Therefore, the pleading is uncertain and the Court will sustain the demurrer on this ground.

Because the Court finds the complaint uncertain and sustains the demurrer on this ground, the Court does not (and cannot as a result of the uncertainty) address the general demurrer issues of whether or not the allegations are sufficient to state any cause of action.

The Department contends that under Civil Code section 1798.40 and Government Code section 7929.605, it is not required to disclose test results to Rason, and that Rason cannot cure the deficiencies in the complaint by amendment. As this is the original complaint of Rason, the Court will grant Rason leave to amend. (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Insurance Company (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411-412.)