Yong Wang, et al. v. Taocheng Liu
Yong Wang, et al. v. Taocheng Liu
Case Number
24CV02860
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 07/17/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike Under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (Anti- SLAPP)
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Yong Wang: Self-Represented
For Plaintiff Meet Up Restaurant, Inc.: Unrepresented
For Defendant Taocheng Liu: Mark Said
RULING
For the reasons set forth herein:
- Defendant Taocheng Liu’s special motion to strike is granted without leave to amend.
- Defendant Taocheng Liu shall recover his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $6,534.00, payable by Plaintiffs Yong Wang and Meet Up Restaurant, Inc., jointly and severally, to counsel for Taocheng Liu.
Background
This action commenced on May 23, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by Plaintiff Yong Wang (“Wang”), on behalf of himself and Plaintiff Meet Up Restaurant Inc. (collectively “Plaintiffs”), against Defendant Taocheng Liu (“Liu”) for defamation.
Previously, on December 14, 2023, Liu filed a complaint against Plaintiffs in Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 23CV05561 setting forth 10 causes of action for alleged violations of the Labor Code.
Plaintiffs filed the present action in response to Case No. 23CV05561. As alleged in the present complaint: “During his employment, Defendant was paid $5500 monthly, received three meals a day, and had free accommodation provided by Plaintiff’s company.” (Complaint, ¶ 6.) “After the termination of his employment, Defendant hired a lawyer on a contingency fee basis and initiated a lawsuit against Plaintiff.” (Complaint, ¶ 7.) “Defendant and his attorney have made defamatory statements, including claims that Plaintiff did not provide meals and did not pay for overtime, which are false and have caused significant harm to Plaintiff’s personal and professional reputation.” (Complaint, ¶ 8.) “Defendant has also falsely claimed that he was not given adequate wages, which is untrue and damaging to Plaintiff’s reputation.” (Compliant, ¶ 9.) “All other allegations made by Defendant against Plaintiff are baseless and unfounded.” (Complaint, ¶ 10.)
Liu now moves to strike the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the Anti-SLAPP statute) on the grounds that the litigation privilege applies, and Plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous and have no chance of success. The motion was properly served on Plaintiffs June 4, 2024.
Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition or any other document in response to the motion.
Analysis
As an initial matter, on May 22, 2024, Wang was informed in Case No. 23CV05561 that, as a corporation, Meet Up is precluded from representing itself before the Court and that Wong cannot represent meet up because Wong is not a licensed attorney. Wong filed the present complaint one day after being so informed. The Court reiterates that Meet Up must be represented by a licensed attorney to appear before the Court.
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides, in relevant parts:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.
(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the Court determines that the Plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the Plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
(2) In making its determination, the Court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.
(3) If the Court determines that the Plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.
* * *
(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . . [Emphasis added.]
“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the Defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16. [Citation.] If the Defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation, fn.] The Court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the Plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the Plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the Defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.)
1.First Prong
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the Defendant’s act underlying the Plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citations.] Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the Defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.] ‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving Defendant can satisfy the [“arising from”] requirement is to demonstrate that the Defendant’s conduct by which Plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e)....’ [Citation.] In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, Courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the Defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062–1063.)
- Litigation privilege
Under Civil Code section 47(b), a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding is privileged.
The litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47, applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside the Courtroom and no function of the Court, or its officers is involved. (Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 381.) The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213-214.)
The principal purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access to the Courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.) To achieve this purpose, Courts have given the litigation privilege a broad interpretation. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) Other purposes underlying the litigation privilege include the promotion of the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence in judicial proceedings; assurance of the utmost freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing; promotion of the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients’ interests; and enhancement of the finality of judgments by avoiding “an unending roundelay of litigation.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 213-214.)
The privilege is a matter of substantive law and, when applicable, is absolute, because it applies regardless of the communicator’s motives, morals, ethics, or intent. (Id. at pp. 216, 220.)
The litigation privilege has been held applicable to all torts except malicious prosecution; malicious prosecution actions are permitted because the policy of encouraging free access to the Courts is outweighed by the policy of affording redress for individual wrongs when the requirements of favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 215-216, citing Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 382.) The privilege has been held to immunize Defendants from tort liability based on theories of abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional inducement of breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, negligent misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, negligence, and fraud (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 215), as well as suits to enjoin tortious conduct, and suits alleging interference with contract and related claims, including unfair competition. (Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1201-1203 [Plaintiff may not plead around the privilege barrier by relabeling the nature of the action].).
Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint is based entirely upon the filing of litigation in Case No. 23CV05561. There are no allegations in the complaint that pertain to any activity outside of that litigation. The litigation privilege unquestionably applies, thus satisfying the first prong.
2.Second Prong
“If the Court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The Court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the Plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the Plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
The litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense which Plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522.) A Plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if the litigation privilege precludes the Defendant’s liability on the claim. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323.)
“ ‘To demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, the Plaintiff must show that the complaint is legally sufficient and must present a prima facie showing of facts that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a judgment in the Plaintiff’s favor. [Citations.] The Plaintiff’s showing of facts must consist of evidence that would be admissible at trial. . . . [Citations.]” (JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1521.)
At this second stage, “a Plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.)
As stated above, Plaintiffs have failed to oppose the motion and have not set forth any evidence that demonstrates an ability to prevail on the merits. The motion will be granted and, as there is no likelihood that the complaint is capable of amendment to state a valid cause of action, Plaintiffs will not be given leave to amend.
3. Attorney Fees and Costs
With exceptions not present here, “a prevailing Defendant [or cross-Defendant] on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).)
Liu seeks a total of $6,534.00 in attorneys fees and costs for bringing the present motion. Defendant’s counsel has spent 17.1 hours reviewing the complaint, researching, drafting, finalizing, and filing the motion to strike, at the rate of $350.00 per hour, and has incurred costs in the amount of $549.00. (Said Dec., ¶¶ 15-16.) The Court finds the amount of attorneys fees and costs reasonable and, based on the circumstances, necessary. Defendant’s request for an award of fees and costs will be granted in the amount requested.