Fernando Castro-Ramirez vs General Motors LLC

Case Number

22CV04207

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 04/18/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Attorneys Fees; OSC Dismissal

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is granted in the amount of $36,243.00.

Background:

Plaintiff Fernando Castro-Ramirez filed a complaint in this matter on October 26, 2022, alleging five causes of action against defendant General Motors, LLC (GM): (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of express written warranty (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.2, subd. (a), & 1794); and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.1 & 1794).

As alleged in the complaint, on June 20, 2022, plaintiff purchased a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (the vehicle) manufactured and distributed by defendant General Motors, LLC (GM). (Compl., ¶ 6.) In connection with the purchase, plaintiff received a express written warranty providing that in the event a defect developed during the warranty period, plaintiff could deliver the vehicle for repair to GM’s representative. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The vehicle developed defects during the warranty period which impair its use, safety, and value. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13 & 16.) GM and its representatives were unable or failed to service or repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. (Id. at ¶ 15.)

GM filed its answer to plaintiff’s complaint on December 8, 2022, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-six affirmative defenses.  

On August 19, 2024, the parties attended mediation which resulted in the settlement of this action on September 23, 2024. (Jiang Decl., ¶ 22.) The settlement was the result of plaintiff accepting GM’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, which included an agreement that plaintiff would be the prevailing party for purposes of a fee motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23.)

On November 11, 2024, the parties had a telephone discussion regarding fees and costs but were unable to reach an agreement. (Jiang Decl., ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff now moves for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $41,243.00. The motion was served on GM January 23, 2025.

GM has not filed opposition or any other responsive document to the motion.

Analysis:

“California follows the ‘American rule,’ under which each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay his or her own attorney fees.” (Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 516.) “[A] court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)

However, attorneys’ fees are allowable as costs if authorized by “contract,” “statute,” or “law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)-(C).)

In the present matter, attorneys’ fees are allowable as authorized by statute.

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section [Song-Beverly Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code., § 1794, subd. (d).)

“Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) requires the attorney fees to be based on “ ‘actual time expended” ’ ” and to have been “ ‘reasonably incurred.’ ” In Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818–819 (Robertson), the court concluded, “ ‘the statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees’ ” because “ ‘the lodestar adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective starting point of the analysis [citation], it is compatible with this statutory provision.’ ” The lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d), the court reasoned, because “ ‘the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and no such contrary intent is apparent.’ ” (Robertson, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 821, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731.) We agree. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 997.)

“The lodestar adjustment method requires the trial court first to determine a touchstone or lodestar figure based on actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. [Citation.] “ ‘The touchstone figure may then be augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.’ ” [Citation.] For Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claims, “ ‘[a] prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘ “showing that the fees incurred were “ ‘allowable,’ ” were “ ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ ” and were “ ‘reasonable in amount.’ ” ’ ” [Citation.]” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 998.)

“[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Plaintiff’s counsel has provided very lightly redacted billing records showing the tasks performed during the course of this matter. The court has reviewed the billing records and finds that the tasks performed were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.

Plaintiff’s counsel charges between $414 and $515 per hour for attorney time and between $200 and $210 per hour for paralegal time. The court finds the amounts reasonable and similar to what other similarly skilled attorneys practicing in Santa Barbara charge.

As noted above, plaintiff seeks $41,243.00 in total attorneys’ fees. However, $5,000.00 of that amount if for anticipated fees for reviewing opposition, drafting a reply, and appearing at the hearing on the fee motion. Because no opposition was filed, plaintiff will not be reimbursed for review of the opposition or preparation of a reply brief. Also, because the motion is unopposed, it is more likely than not that no party will request oral argument and this tentative ruling will be adopted as the order of the court. Therefore, plaintiff will not be reimbursed for an appearance at the hearing.

Attorneys’ fees will be awarded in the amount of $36,243.00.